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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
MORTGAGE IN CHINA 
 
By 
 
Xiong Liping 
 
 
 
After 25 years of reform and opening to the outside world, China is now in a rapidly 
developing stage from planned economy to market economy. So many unprecedented 
changes are taking place in this country, especially in economy field. As a very 
important sector to the whole economy, China banking industry has always been 
hesitating in reform although changes in this largely state-owned industry are in fact 
unavoidable. Changes have to happen in the banking industry because the 
non-performing loan (NPL) rate is very high in almost all these state-owned banks. 
Meanwhile more competitive foreign banks are coming into the domestic market after 
China’s entry into WTO to compete with them directly. It is urgent for Chinese banks 
to speed up its transition from planned economy banks to modernized commercial 
banks. Mortgage is one of those changes. It is a new idea to China and it came into 
China only in the middle of 1990s. Banks which were so unwilling to have it at first 
now regard it as a promising product and a sign of hope when they are struggling 
against NPLs. The reason is that mortgage has a very low default rate up till now in 
China comparing with other loans, particularly those granted to state-owned 
enterprises (SOE). So there is no wonder mortgage loans grow at 100% annually sinc
e it was introduced into China. Mortgage is introduced to China from western 
countries, it developed in China into quite different forms because of China’s unique 
political, legal and cultural characteristics. Although most banks in China regard 
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mortgage loans as a high-quality asset with almost no risk, unfortunately it is not risk 
free. This thesis takes efforts to introduce the overview of the mortgage development 
in China and focuses on its current problems and alternative solutions by considering 
both experiences and lessons from other countries and the particular situation in 
present China. Those risks brought by mortgages to banks include credit risk, liquidity 
risk, interest rate risk, collateral disposal risk, market risk and policy risk. Some of 
these risks are common in countries where mortgage exists, but some of them are 
unique to China since China is a developing socialist country, a country that is trying 
everything, which were not familiar to her before. The thesis also examines the 
ways to protect mortgage-making banks against those risks, for example, to establish 
credit scoring system, securitize mortgages, improve mortgage application 
examination procedures, provide more mortgage products and increase its service 
level, etc. It is emphasized that all these measures can’t be done without the 
government’s support. This is also a feature of China, where the reform is directed by 
the central government. It is only with government’s support that it is possible to 
establish good legal infrastructure, primary and secondary mortgage markets, national 
guarantee system and mortgage registration system. Government can also encourage 
more institutional investors to participate in the mortgage market.  
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I. Introduction 
 
As real estate industry becomes the pillar industry in China, it becomes very 
important to the national economic development. The development of real estate 
industry depends heavily on the reform and development of real estate finance 
system, one key part of which is mortgage business. Mortgage is a pivotal issue in 
real estate finance and it helps a great deal to solve housing problems. Therefore, the 
research on mortgage, particularly on the risk brought by mortgages to financial 
institutions and on the measures of guarding against those risks are of great meaning 
to promote mortgage market, the housing and the real estate industry development.   
 
II. Background Information 
 
A. Land System  
After the foundation of People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Constitution 
stipulates that all the land in this country is owned by the whole Chinese people and 
is managed by the central and local governments. The former owners of a land can 
use that land, but does not own it, but they still own the houses on that land. While 
governments have right to requisition a land. Under the planned economy, land is 
allocated free to some specific uses, for example building a factory, without paying 
any price but should not be used for any other purposes other than the 
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nation-stipulated one. 
 
China adopted an Open and Reform policy since 1978 and gradually changed itself 
from planned economy to market economy since then. In April, 1988, an amendment 
of the Constitution makes it possible for the government to rent a land. 
 
In 1990, the use right of urban land is allowed to be sold and transferred with a price. 
The transferable use right usually lasts for 70 years. This ends the 40-year history of 
non-transferable land system in China. 
 
The Land Management Law of P.R.China published in June, 1986 provides that the 
ownership of all the land in China is exercised by State Council. In fact, the local 
governments are the real management agents, who determine the specific uses of a 
land according to a national land-development scheme. 
 
Since 2002, land transference has to be carried out by bidding in an open auction 
instead of being decided by the central and local governments, which is meant to get 
rid of the unfair deals between the government officials and land developers for the 
purpose of reducing corruption. 
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It’s not easy for government to properly adjust land supply in a market economy way 
because sometimes governments may go above the market. The management of land 
by governments turns out to be low-efficient and causes corruption. Some scholars in 
China advocate the privatization of the ownership of land in China in the near future, 
but that is not an easy thing. 
 
B. Housing System  
Since the foundation of China in 1949, the housing of urban people is planned and 
provided by central and local governments and state-owned enterprises(SOE). 
Usually an employee who works for state-owned units will be given an apartment 
almost free from their working units. These working units, governments or 
enterprises, are responsible for financing and building houses for their employees 
and they are also in charge of distributing and reallocating houses to them according 
to their seniority. The result of this welfare housing system is that in the following 30 
year since 1949, the average living space per capita in urban area had dropped from 
4.5 to 3.6 square meters(1). Another result of the system is a few higher rank senior 
people have very big houses while a large number of common workers share a 
smaller percentage of houses. A not-the-exception example is that a three-generation 
family lived in a single room of 20 square meters for nearly ten year in Shanghai, the 
biggest city in China. This welfare housing system also became an unbearable 
burden for state-owned enterprises, especially for those not-well-managed ones, and 
a big hinder in the SOE reform in 1980s. 
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Since 1980s, Chinese government began the housing system reform, which helps 
SOEs gradually replace the welfare housing with housing subsidies system. 
Governments and enterprises don’t have to build houses for their employees any 
more. Instead new employees only get housing subsidies to rent or buy houses in the 
market. As for those already alloted houses, employees have to pay a price, much 
lower than the market price, to buy them and thus own them. These homeowners are 
also allowed to rent or sell their houses to other people, too, which they were 
forbidden to do before the reform. Until 1998, the free house allotment system has 
been replaced by housing subsidies system nationwide. As a result, the average 
living space per capita in urban area increased from 7.8 to 20.5 square meters in the 
period of 1980-2000(2). 
 
In the Chinese real estate market, originally there are not many house buying and 
selling. In the first few years after the Open and Reform, only a few rich people can 
buy houses. But after the housing system reform, except those who have already had 
a house before the reform, most newly employed people have to rent or buy a house, 
or they have to live with their parents if they find a job in their hometown.  
 
Usually they will rent an apartment either by themselves or sharing with other people. 
Later with the increasing of salary and savings, they will buy an apartment. Most 
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homeowners in Chinese urban areas live in apartments buildings.  Detached houses 
are luxury goods to them. In the countryside, rural people live in very simple 
detached houses. 
 
When people buy an apartment, they may get financial support from their parents or 
use their own savings, borrow from relatives or friends, make loans from Mandatory 
Provident Housing Fund, or borrow money from mortgage banks. It’s not easy for 
low-income people to obtain mortgages. Instead they can make use of the Low-rent 
Housing Plan or apply for a loan from Mandatory Provident Housing Fund, which 
have not-so-strict requirements for loan applicants and thus is easier for them to get 
the financial aid than from bank mortgages. The Mandatory Provident Housing Fund 
is composed of payments from both employers and employees by a certain 
percentage of employees’ salary. The fund is used by employees for downpayment 
and monthly payment for their houses or apartments 
 
C. Financial System 
The establishment of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) in 1948 marked the 
beginning of a new chapter in the Chinese banking history. China adopted the 
planned economy model of the former Soviet Union and correspondingly a highly 
centralized banking system. Such an all-in-one system was gradually abandoned 
after the Reform and Opening in 1970s. 
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Through five decades of evolution, particularly nearly two decades of reform and 
opening to the outside world, China’s banking sector has entered a stage of vigorous 
development. With PBC as the central bank, the current banking system in China 
consists mainly of wholly state-owned commercial banks, which coexist and 
cooperate with policy banks and joint-equity commercial banks operating in their 
respective authorized business domains.  
 
There are four big state-owned commercial banks in China and they are usually 
called “big four”. They are Industrial and Commercial Bank of China(ICBC), Bank 
of China(BOC), China Construction Bank(CCB) and Agricultural Bank of 
China(ABC). The headquarters of PBC and “big four” are all located in Beijing.  
 
The three major policy banks in China are State Development Bank, Agricultural 
Development Bank of China and Export-Import Bank of China.  
 
Big joint-equity banks include China Bank of Communication, China Everbright 
Bank, China Merchants Bank, China Minsheng Banking Corp. Ltd, Beijing City 
Commercial Bank(changed its name to Beijing Bank in 2004), CITIC(China 
International Trust and Investment Corp.) Industrial Bank and Shenzhen 
Development Bank. According to the schedule of opening its banking industry to the 
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outside as China promised upon joining WTO, there will more and more foreign 
banks in a couple of years in the China banking industry. They will cover more and 
more banking businesses in China. 
 
D. Regulatory Authorities  
Ministry of Land and Resources is responsible for the planning, management, 
protection and proper use of the land, mineral, sea and other natural resources. 
 
Ministry of Construction is responsible for the construction industry, housing system, 
real estate market and public facility system. 
 
People’s Bank of China acts as the central bank of China and is responsible for 
supervising all Chinese banks and makes various banking policies. 
National Development and Reform Commission is responsible for formulating 
national long-term development and reform plans and assists in implementing those 
plans. 
 
Most land developer, most construction companies and most banks in China are 
owned by the government and regulated by the government. Modern market 
economy is not familiar to China, so the market-economy-style legal system and 
administrative management system are only at the beginning stage of development in 
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China. Most Chinese people are used to the ideas and way of living in planned 
economy although they are changing rapidly now. A very important characteristic of 
economic activities in China is that almost all economic activities are still heavily 
influenced by government policies. 
 
III. History 
Before 1978, China is in planned economy. The main purpose is to achieve equality. 
But its consequence is the loss of efficiency and the shortage economy. The 
productivity decreased to the lowest level. There were much more demand for 
various consumer goods than their supply. People suffered from being short of 
everything. 
 
After 1978, China began to change from planned economy to market economy for 
the purpose of improving productivity. As a result of twenty-six years’ efforts, the 
Chinese economy did change a lot, at least there is no shortage of consumer goods 
any more and Chinese people began to work hard to buy all kinds of goods from 
food, household appliances, TVs, refrigerators, computers, cars to even houses. 
 
From 1980s to 1998, the period of housing system reform, Chinese people can’t have 
free houses from the governments or their working units any more and they have to 
buy their own homes with savings or borrowings in the real estate market. 
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In October 1995, People Bank of China allowed some commercial banks (firstly 
China Construction Bank) in some cities to make mortgage loans to their customers. 
But the requirements for loan applicants are very strict: dual guarantee of the 
acquired house as a collateral and the third party’s personal guarantee and the 
maximum maturity of mortgages is 10 years. Being eligible to apply for a mortgage, 
the customer must have a time deposit with the mortgage bank of an amount of at 
least 30% of the house-purchasing price and of at least half a year deposit time in 
advance.(3) 
 
In April 1997, the People’s Bank of China loosened the strict requirement for 
applying for a mortgage, for example, no dual guarantee, no time deposit in advance 
and a lower mortgage interest rate than the fixed assets loan rate. And the 
loan-processing time of banks should be less than 3 months. 
 
In April 1998, the People’s Bank of China allowed all the commercial banks in China 
to make mortgage loans for purchasing all kinds of residential houses in all cities in 
China. And PBC also asked the banks to reduce the processing time from 3 months 
to 3 weeks. This policy greatly stimulated the increasing of the amount of mortgage 
loans made since then. The total mortgage loans made in 1997 is 14 billion Yuan 
RMB only, but 32.4 billion Yuan in 1998 and 85.8 billion Yuan in 1999.(4) 
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In 1999, the PBC increased the Loan to Value (LOV) ratio from 70% to 80%, 
lengthened the mortgage maturity from 20 years to 30 years, further decreased the 
interest rate and encourage commercial banks to improve their service in making 
mortgage loans. This further encourage the development of mortgages and Chinese 
mortgage market goes into a rapid increasing stage in 2000. In fact, 50% of new 
loans made in 2000 are mortgage loans. In 2000, mortgage market in China grew 
rapidly. Nearly 50% of the loans made that year are mortgages loans.(5) 
 
Worrying about the rapid increase of mortgages, PBC in June 2001 required all the 
commercial banks to appraise collaterals and register mortgages. It also stipulated 
that LOV ratio should be strictly within 80% and no “zero down payment”(i.e. 100% 
LOV) is allowed. 
 
In June 2003, afraid of an unconfirmed real estate bubble, PBC excludes individuals 
who purchase the second house or apartment (could be for investment purpose 
instead of residential purpose) in his name from enjoying the preferential mortgage 
rate. The LOV ratio should be lower (lower than 80%) to them and loan maturity 
should also be shorter (less than 30 years), too. See Figure 1. 
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(source: People’s Bank of China) 
 
In October 2003, PBC became more optimistic about the prospect of the real estate 
market and claimed that real estate industry had become a pillar industry to Chinese 
economy, which has been taken as a sign of encouragement to developers and 
commercial banks. But the central bank still emphasizes the importance of risk 
management in mortgage of commercial banks and the focus of future development 
of mortgage is to middle- and low-income people. For those low-income people, the 
government began the Mandatory Provident Housing Fund in 1996 and provides 
cheap-rent houses to them, too. 
 
At present, not only state-owned banks but also joint-venture banks make mortgage 
loans to urban residents not only in big cities but also in suburb towns to buy either a 
new apartment or an existing apartment. All the banks are improving their services in 
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all aspects from mortgage products to banks’ employees’ attitudes to their customers.  
But the primary mortgage in China is still far from being perfect. For example, the 
mortgage rate is determined by PBC and fixed nation-wide. Usually mortgagors 
don’t have many choices in selecting a bank. Instead they have to apply for mortgage 
to a bank designated by developers. Mortgage for buying a second-hand apartment is 
not common and as convenient to make as mortgage for buying a new apartment. 
There is almost no refinancing in China. 
For a very long time in the planned economy, most Chinese people believe that 
banks only provide loans to enterprises for production and banks loans have nothing 
to do with individuals’ consumption. So the consumer loans, appeared in 1990s, are 
revolutionary ideas to both banks and bank customers.  The consumer loans are 
only 6% of the total loans in China in 2001, while the percentage is nearly 60% in 
the U.S.A. (6) See Figure 2. 
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(source: People’s Bank of China) 
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At present, even if in China Construction Bank, which is the first bank in China to 
offer, mortgages to its customers, mortgage balance is only 1% of its total credit. 
While in developed countries, mortgage loans have reached 20-40% of their total 
loans. In terms of mortgage scale, the ratio of mortgage in GDP in 1995 is 55% in 
the United States, 32% in Hong Kong, 23% in Malaysia, 11% in Korea. But it is less 
than 1% in China even in 1998. See Figure 3. See Figure 3. 
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(source: People’s Bank of China & China National Statistics Bureau) 
 
There is great potential for further development of Chinese mortgage market. The 
current expense on houses of urban Chinese people is still low (10% in 2002) (7) 
comparing to the average 20-30% of western countries. In addition to the present 
huge demand for houses as a result of housing system reform, there are other sources 
for housing and thus mortgage demand. Firstly, China is now having numerous 
big-scale reconstruction projects; therefore many residents have to buy a new home 
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to live elsewhere. Secondly, urbanization will be the biggest force to drive up the 
need for houses and also for mortgages. In fact, the mortgages have been growing at 
the speed of 100% and will continue a high-speed growth in the future 10 to 15 years. 
(8) 
 
The bad loan rate for mortgages in China is only 0.25%, which makes mortgages one 
of the best assets for banks. All banks are trying to get a piece of the delicious cake.  
 
In fact, as a trend of the world banking industry, credit business customer are now 
moving from big-size manufacturers and high-risk enterprises, which gradually turn 
to direct financing, to medium- and small-size service industry and personal credit 
which centers on mortgages. The low risk retail business is the direction for banking 
industry development. Data shows that the percentage of personal mortgage in the 
commercial banking business has reached 20% in Japan and more than 40% in the 
United States. But even in 2003, the percentage of consumer loans in total loans is 
less than 10%, let alone mortgage. See Figure 3. According to the statistics of the 
United Nations, when the average GDP per capita of each country is in the lap of 
US$800 to US$13,000, houses consumption will be continuously growing. The 
current GDP capital of China is US$1,000 and China mortgage has a great potential. 
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IV. Problems 
Although mortgage doesn’t have a long history in China, but the whole society 
benefits a lot from it. Their living standard have improved a lot with mortgages 
because they don’t have to wait for decades until they saved enough money to buy a 
house. Mortgage with a low default rate also provide a high-quality asset to 
mortgage banks. It’s particularly important to Chinese banks when their big 
customers, state-owned enterprises are struggling with bad performance and thus are 
unable to repay their debts. Mortgage also stimulates the domestic need for houses 
and consequently contributes to the growth of the real estate industry, a very strong 
force to push China’s GDP growth. 
 
But with the growth of mortgages in China, the corresponding risks also come to 
face banks, especially when the mortgage is in the beginning stage in China. 
State-owned banks always have support from the government, so there is no risk to 
them and they don’t have any idea of risk management. But it is different now when 
the country is changing to market economy. The government wants banks to be 
efficient and profitable, but not only an accountant of the government. After the 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) of  Bank of China and China Construction Bank, the 
other two big state-owned banks, Industrial Bank of China and Agriculture Bank of 
China, are also considering their IPO. Those potential risks include credit risk, 
liquidity risk, interest rate risk, the difficulty to dispose collaterals and risk brought 
by macroeconomic changes.. 
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A. Credit Risk 
Mortgage is a new thing to Chinese banks and it is greatly influenced by government 
policies. It is pushed to appear by governments. At first, banks hesitated to make 
mortgages and people are reluctant to apply for a mortgage because traditionally 
banks only take enterprises as their customer, but not individuals. Chinese people 
value no debts of the family a lot and they tend to think of a debt as a bad thing. 
However, this has changed greatly in China. Banks changed their views from only 
serving businesses to serving both businesses and individual consumers. People also 
began to accept consumer loans and are not afraid of borrowing money from banks 
to purchase their homes any more, partly because their ideas on debts have changed 
and partly because this could be the only way to buy a house except saving for many 
year. But they are still very careful about the decision of applying for a bank loan. 
 
Banks now tend to consider mortgages as much safer loans than commercial loans 
and a kind of loan with greater growth potential. China Construction Bank (CCB) 
and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) are the two earliest and the 
two biggest mortgagees in China. It is reported by CCB that the default rat of 
mortgages in CCB until the end of 2001 is only 1.35%(9) and the ICBC reports its 
mortgage default rate until April 2003 is only 1.29%.(10) If that is the fact, then it is 
a very low ratio comparing to the international standards. According to American 
Mortgage Association, the default rate of mortgage in the United States is 4.25% 
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(11)until the first quarter of 2003.  
 
But does it reveal the true default risk? Probably not. First the calculating method is 
in question. Most banks use the balance amount of the current year as the numerator 
instead of the mortgage balance in the whole maturity while People’s Bank of China 
(central bank of China, PBC) requires the total balancing mortgage is the 
non-performing loan (NPL) if its monthly payment is delayed one month. For 
example, for a mortgage of 300,000 Yuan RMB with a yearly payment of 20,000, if 
the monthly payment is delayed one month, whether use 300,000 or 20,000 as the 
numerator will make a big difference to the default rate of mortgages.  
 
Secondly besides defaults due to financial problems, there are intentional cheatings 
of mortgages. One paragraph of the auditing report of 2002 to People’s Congress 
given by the Chief-auditor of China National Auditing Agency on June 25th, 2003 is 
in the following: “a sample checking up of mortgages in eight sub-branches of CCB 
in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province found that an amount of one billion Yuan RMB 
is deliberate cheating of loans by individuals. The suspects were arrested by the 
police.” In fact, this cheated mortgage loans in the sample checking-up is already 
10% of the total mortgages in CCB Guangzhou Branch. The mortgage in Guangzhou 
Branch is 5% of the total mortgage in CCB. But this is only a sample checking-up, 
the real situation could be worse. According to the report, in all these frauds, 
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developers are both sellers and buyers. If the houses don’t sell well, developers ask 
their friends or relatives to apply for mortgages and buy the houses, usually with a 
higher price than the market price. Developers instead of the mortgagors pay the 
down payment and even monthly payment. The mortgagors often use false names 
and false income certification. As a result, the banks bear the default risks and the 
bubbled price risk in disposing the collaterals if the mortgagors, actually the 
developers, can’t repay the loans. 
 
This reveals serious loopholes in banks’ examination of mortgage applicants. Banks 
are required by “Guidelines on Mortgages” of PBC in 1998 to make sure that 
mortgage applicants should have stable job and income, good credit history and the 
ability to repay the loan. Although the requirements are quite subjective judgment 
since there are no credit agencies in China, banks can’t be said to have done their 
duty properly. 
 
Although Chinese banks changed a lot in the direction of really modern commercial 
banks. But most of them, at least the biggest four, are still state-owned, which means 
they still have a strong color of planned economy either in management team, the 
management style or system. In addition, most big real estate developers are 
state-owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises have a typical logic, which is that 
banks loans to them are just like the government puts the money in one of his pocket 
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into another pocket.  
 
In the past, it was unnecessary for Chinese banks to do any research before granting 
a loan in the planned economy because the loans they made were policy loans and 
the government was responsible for them. So Chinese banks did not have good loan 
applications examination and approving procedures until recently. They used to 
make loans according the governments’ decision or by their impression or 
relationship with customers. In examining and approving mortgage applications, 
Chinese bankers often use their subjective judgment, which is not reliable, especially 
in this transition period in Chinese history. Although Chinese banks usually set very 
strict requirements for mortgage applicants, which are troublesome to many 
applicants, credit officials are dogmatic in examining and approving mortgages and 
as a result, they seldom refuse mortgage applications, at least much lower than the 
20-50% rejection rate in the United States. Without risk management before making 
loans, Chinese banks put themselves in a dangerous situation.  
 
On one hand, Chinese people don’t think indebtedness is good. On the other hand, 
they don’t know how important a person’s credit record is to them in a market 
economy. Although the default rate of consumer loans in China looks low, default of 
consumer loans do exist. Even in loans made to university students for their tuitions, 
who are considered as high-quality customers by banks, there are defaults and banks 
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can’t do many thing about this because a student may study and get a loan in one city, 
but work and live in another far away city after graduation. Or students may move 
from one city to another after graduation.  
 
In fact, there was no credit scoring system at all until the latest four or five year. 
Although Chinese banks begin to establish customers’ credit record database and 
there appeared the first credit bureau in Shanghai in 2002, they are far from being 
well established. “It will be a disaster to make a lot of mortgages before establishing 
credit scoring system,” said by a top economist at the Asian Development Bank. 
 
B. Liquidity Risk 
Usually the liquidity of assets has an opposite relationship with its maturity. The 
longer maturity of the asset is, the less liquid it becomes. Mortgage undoubtedly has 
the longest maturity among all banks’ assets. Banks bear liquidity risk when they get 
their fund from short-term financial sources, but use their fund on long-term asset, 
for example, mortgages. 
 
This mismatch of assets and liabilities also exists in Chinese banks. The majority of 
asset resources of Chinese banks are savings from enterprises and individuals and are 
of short or middle maturity while mortgages are mainly as long as 10 to 20 years. 
Thus banks expose themselves to a risk of mismatch in maturities of their financial 
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resources and uses. If the savings slows down or loans are excessively made, banks 
have to face liquidity difficulty and even payment crisis or run-on. 
 
If credit risk is a current risk facing Chinese banks, liquidity risk is a future problem 
for them. Liquidity risk was not so serious because of the high savings rate. But in 
the long run, it will be a danger to Chinese banks because firstly, with the foreign 
banks coming into China, Chinese depositors have more choices to deposit their 
money and they don’t have deposit their money only in Chinese banks. Secondly, 
Chinese people are changing their saving behavior, especially young people tend to 
consume more than their savings. Thirdly, Chinese will have more freedom to 
exchange their RMB deposit into foreign currencies. Recently liquidity situation has 
been greatly improved because a large amount of foreign currencies are exchanged 
into RMB with the rise of interest rate in China. But if the movement is the opposite, 
that is a large amount of RMB are exchanged into foreign currencies, Chinese banks 
will face difficulty in liquidity. 
  
C. Interest Rate Risk 
Interest rate risk firstly lies in the fact that banks pay floating rate to its depositors, 
but charge comparatively fixed rate to mortgagors. Only when the central 
government adjusts rates, can mortgage rate change correspondingly. And mortgage 
rate is relatively low due to the central government’s intension of encouraging 
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mortgage development. However, savings rate changes frequently with prices or 
other factors. If savings rate rises and loan rate doesn’t change, banks face a loss. If 
savings rate falls, mortgagors may refinance by borrowing from other resources with 
a lower cost and repay the mortgage in advance and thus banks can’t realize their 
expected revenue. 
 
Interest rate risk mainly lies in the fixed-rate mortgages. For variable rate mortgages, 
banks can avoid interest rate risk by relating its mortgage rate to market rate and thus 
transferring most of the risk to mortgagors. For fixed-rate mortgages, interest rate 
risk lies in the uncertainty of the expected future market interest rate by financial 
institutions. 
 
The refinance is different from default risk in the fact that there is no default in 
repaying the mortgage. But the loan is repaid earlier than the contract stipulated date. 
For financial institutions, there is an unexpected repaid fund. But the financial 
institution is also not prepared about how to use the fund. And there comes the loss 
for the bank that it can’t find an investment channel for this fund with the same 
profitability of mortgages. In addition, usually mortgagors choose to prepay the loan 
in advance because the market rate falls and the refinancing cost decreases. As a 
result, mortgage banks will lose because they can’t get the expected higher return as 
agreed in the contract. Therefore, for a carefully made credit portfolio, repayment in 
advance composes a risk. 
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Changes of interest rate are unavoidable. If banks make floating rate mortgages, 
mortgage applicants may be unable to bear it. In fact, a big problem in China now is 
that the housing price is much more higher than people’s average income. If Chinese 
banks apply the present fixed mortgage rate, they have to be able to manage the 
liquidity and refinancing risks. In the United States, there is terms in the mortgage as 
to whether the mortgagors can repay the loan in advance or not or when they can if 
they are allowed to do so, how much mortgagors have to pay the old mortgagee 
when they decide to finance their mortgages.  
Table 1 
                           Interest Rate of RMB Loans      
Adjustment time Maturity         
    6 months 1 year 1-3 years 3-5 years 5 years + 
1991.04.21 8.1 8.64 9 9.54 9.72
1993.05.15 8.82 9.36 10.81 12.06 12.24
1993.07.11 9 10.98 12.24 13.86 14.04
1995.01.01 9 10.98 12.96 14.58 14.76
1995.07.01 10.08 12.06 13.5 15.12 15.3
1996.05.01 9.72 10.98 13.14 14.94 15.12
1996.08.23 9.18 10.08 10.98 11.7 12.42
1997.10.23 7.65 8.64 9.36 9.9 10.53
1998.03.25 7.02 7.92 9 9.72 10.35
1998.07.01 6.57 6.93 7.11 7.65 8.01
1998.12.07 6.12 6.39 6.66 7.2 7.56
1999.06.10 5.58 5.85 5.94 6.03 6.21
2002.02.21 5.04 5.31 5.49 5.58 5.76
2004.10.29 5.22 5.58 5.76 5.85 6.58
(source: People’s Bank of China) 
Mortgages are long-term loans, which can't avoid experience the rate changes. 
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Chinese government has changed the interest rate a dozen times in the past ten years. 
But Chinese banks have not experienced a full cycle of interest rate changes, so they 
are not prepared for the risks brought about by the rate changes. 
  
D. Difficulty of Disposing Collaterals 
There are two kinds of risks involved in bank’s disposing of collaterals. The first one 
is that the market value of collaterals has decreased below the mortgage balance. The 
second one is that the mortgage right can’t be exercised because of legal problems, 
ownership deficiency or of too high exercising cost. 
 
In fact, Chinese banks have not faced the real challenge of mortgages yet --- the fall 
of real estate price. For example, the real property price decreased 4% in 2002 and 
2% in the first half year in 2003(12). There are doubts about the real estate bubble in 
some cities in China now. It’s possible that the price drop can’t be covered by the 
20% or 30%(13) down payment. In Guangzhou, some apartment buildings involving 
cheating of mortgage loans have decreased 40-60%(14) in price.  
Also the collateral experience damage of a certain levels because of accidental or 
intentional action of the mortgagor or a third party, and as a result the value of the 
collateral drops below the mortgage balance. 
There is no well-established real estate title registration system, no open and active 
auction market and no trustworthy agencies for banks to dispose their collaterals, so 
banks may experience title defects and it is neither easy nor quickly to liquidate a 
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house. Even banks can sell the collateral; it is not easy to exercise it because the 
customer may be homeless. Only after the social security system is established in 
China,    
 
E. Macroeconomic Changes 
A particular characteristic of Chinese real estate financing is that real estate 
developers don’t have many financing channels. Banks are their primary financial 
source. So another risk to Chinese banks is that not only houses buyers but also 
developers and builders depend on them. What if the whole real estate industry 
depresses if changes happen in macro-economic situation. The real estate industry is 
in the growing stage in China and there are no nationwide dramatic ups and downs 
until now. But we do have that terrifying real estate bubble breaking in Hainan 
Province in 1980s. And there is constant doubt about such bubbles here and there in 
China. If such a situation occurs, how can the banks manage them when the banks 
support the whole industry from developer to consumers? In face, if anyone of the 
developers, builder or consumers defaults to banks or to one another, there will 
forms a risk to banks. If banks grant a loan to developers, they have to make loans to 
builders and consumers, too. Otherwise, developers can’t survive to repay the loan. 
Thus Chinese banks are in a dilemma. If banks tighten the credit to the demand side 
of the real estate industry, there will be over-supply or if banks rein in the supply side, 
the demand will not be met. If banks support both, the whole market could inflate 
and add risk to banks. Thus forms the situation in which bank policies instead of 
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supply and demand decide the real estate market. The problem is that banks can’t 
judge the real changes between supply and demand to keep the market balanced. But 
in the United States, real estate enterprises primarily don’t rely on banks in financing 
and even consumers have other channels to apply for mortgages. Reits? , mortgage 
securitization reduce bank risks greatly and meanwhile efficiently support 
consumption. 
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V. Solutions 
The total return from a commercial loan is the compensation from assuming all these 
risks. 
A. credit risk 
Based on former Soviet Union credit-granting criteria, Chinese banks for a very long 
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time emphasized sticking to credit plans a lot, which is a crucial principle in examine 
loan applications. At that time, banks are government agencies rather than 
profit-making companies. Chinese banks have to establish scientific loan-approving 
procedures, which is crucial to avoid default risks in market economy.   
 
In developed countries like the United States, there are mainly two mortgage 
examining and approving methods: one is qualitative method and the other one is 
quantitative credit scoring. The core of the first method is the “5C”: Character, 
Capacity, Capital, Collateral and Conditions. Credit scoring is based the applicants’ 
credit history to judge an applicant’s risk quantitatively. The “5C” method is already 
applied in some Chinese banks. At present, Chinese banks need to establish the credit 
scoring system to the particular situation of China and combine it with the “5C” 
standards to make Chinese own mortgage appraising system. 
 
Individuals’ credit record had nothing to do with their lives or economic activities 
when there were mainly group production and group consumption in China’s 
planned economy. It was unnecessary to commercialize individuals’ credit record 
when they were allotted houses. People have built their own good credit history 
when most people have to buy a house at the market but are unable to buy it with 
their current income or savings. Government can’t educate people to value their 
credit record. Only benefits or constraints can let them do so. This helps a lot to build 
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credit system and enhances the reform to market economy. 
 
Theoretically, an individuals’ credit record system can solve the adverse selection 
problem, wherein the inability of one trader to assess the quality of the other makes it 
likely that poor-quality traders will predominates. The reason for the adverse 
selection lies in the asymmetry of information, that is, there is no mechanism for 
individuals to pass to banks the information about their creditworthiness and banks 
have no access to their customers’ credit history so that banks can only make loans 
conditions according to the average social credit level. As a result, only high-risk 
customers are willing to borrow money from banks. To avoid such a situation, China 
has to establish credit-scoring system. Firstly, banks build their own database of 
customers’ credit history. Secondly, each bank or financial institution put together his 
or her own database into one. The ultimate goal is to establish independent credit 
bureaus. Without a good credit appraising system, it is impossible to develop mature 
primary mortgage market, not to mention secondary mortgage market. 
 
China’s first credit bureau began its operation in Shanghai in 2002. Shanghai Credit 
Company buys credit information from commercial banks at the price of RMB0.2 
Yuan per customer and charges RMB10 Yuan per person for commercial banks’ 
enquiry, which is much cheaper comparing the $30(240 Yuan) in the western 
countries. The establishment of this company was warmly welcomed by commercial 
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banks, governments and the public as well. Owing to this company, 1.8 million 
residents in Shanghai who have a good credit record are able to get loans at the 
maximum amount of 300, 000 Yuan(15) based solely on their good credit scores and 
without any collaterals, hypothecates or guarantees.  Cities other than Shanghai 
have also started their tentative efforts to build their own credit scoring system. For 
example, Jinan Branch of CCB in Shangdong Province adopted a method to classify 
their customers into four scores: A, B, C and D. While Wuhan Branch of CCB scored 
the credit levels of their Dragon Credit Card customers into 7 groups: 3A, 2A, A, 3B, 
2B, B and C. 
 
Credit rating is a new industry in China. There is neither a complete and 
well-functioning legal framework nor an industry standardized system of 
management and self-regulation. So the credit scores given by the few existing credit 
rating agencies are not well accepted by the public. Therefore, governments and 
financial institutions should take efforts to push the construction of credit rating 
agencies, supervise their operations, and enhance their transparency and 
independence to provide objective, fair and unbiased credit rating information. 
 
In addition, banks can take some other measures to reduce the default risk, for 
example, to provide more flexible repayment schedule to meet the needs of different 
segments of customers, who prefer to repay the majority of the loan at the beginning 
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or who prefer to repay the majority of the loan at the last periods, or who meet 
unexpected and temporary financial difficulties. 
 
One goal of China’s financial reform is to make the interest rate determined by the 
market. Chinese banks then are able to apply different ineptest rates to customers 
with different credit record.  
 
At the first stage of developing credit rating in China, the government should take 
more responsibility. Firstly, the government needs to standardize the practice in the 
credit rating industry of credit reports, data retrieval system, qualification of the 
employees in this field and others. Secondly, the government has to ensure by law 
the credit information public or assembled in a professional which are now held by 
different individual state-owned banks, telecommunication companies and public 
utilities, which is against the current “Act on Commercial Banking” and 
“Anti-illegitimate Competition Act”. Thirdly, the government should gradually leave 
credit rating companies privatized and only concentrate on providing a proper 
environment for them to practice and regulate their conduct by law.  Last but not 
least, the government should encourage the credit rating industry open to the world 
and establishment of joint ventures, which will provide local companies valuable 
opportunities to learn from their experienced peers, especially from American ones 
with the longest history in this area. 
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Credit rating has been worldly recognized as a scientific technique, an art. But in 
China some credit rating companies are not trustworthy themselves. Some of them 
can’t even keep their promises to pay debts. Some of them gave a company a higher 
credit score just because this company donated more money to the credit rating 
company. 
 
B. liquidity risk 
One way to solve the liquidity problem is to develop a secondary market for 
mortgages for Chinese banks. This secondary market is where banks are able to sell 
or securitize their mortgages. This is so-called mortgage securitization refers to the 
fact that banks pool and reorganize their mortgages with low liquidity but future 
cash flows into some sellable groups, sell them to securitization institutions which 
will resell them to other investors after adding guarantee to them and enhancing 
their credit rating. This is a process which turns illiquid mortgages into marketable 
assets. It is called “structured finance” in the United States and a delicate 
arrangement, which in fact distribute banks’ risk to a large group of investors and 
improve the liquidity of banks. 
 
There are many advantages for China to develop mortgage securitization. Firstly, 
banks need not to worry about their risky investment if they can change their 
illiquid mortgages into negotiable securities. Secondly, mortgage securitization 
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enables banks to adjust the structure of their assets and liabilities anytime when 
market changes and thus to be more competitive. Thirdly, it enables banks to make 
more efficient use of their assets since banks can effectively reduce their risky 
assets and therefore reduce their risky assets reserves which is required the Basle 
Accord. Fourthly, mortgage securitization provides small-and medium-scaled banks 
an alternative financing source so that they can also enter into the mortgage market. 
Fifthly, it will enhance the development of Chinese financial market. Theoretically, 
stock market financing is no better nor worse than debt market financing, but a 
financial market with both above-mentioned financing methods is mort efficient in 
allocating resources. In the United States which has the most advanced financial 
market, the capitalization of the debt market financing is 16 times that of the stock 
market financing and securitized mortgages is the biggest negotiable security in the 
debt market and popular among institutional investors. But in China, stock market 
financing weighs much more than debt market financing, which adds to its financial 
risk. The sixth advantage of mortgage securitization is that it will decrease the 
mortgage cost and thus provide more financial support to homebuyers. 
 
PBC has begun its research in mortgage securitization in 1998 and allows CCB and 
ICBC, the two largest morgagees, to do the feasibility study and experiments in 
2000. Until now, the two banks have presented PBC three projects and they are still 
waiting for the approval from the central bank. 
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The reason that it takes such a long time for PBC to approve the trial project of 
mortgage securitization presented by CCB is that PBC prefers the American way of 
mortgage securitization, i.e. banks sell their mortgages to an independent company 
to be pooled and securitized, but CCB insists that the securitizer should be a 
department with banks, which is German way, and the securitized mortgages are 
still owned by banks. CCB explains that the financial environment in China is not 
as sophisticated as it is in the United States. But it is reported by the media that the 
real reason is that mortgages are so far one of the best-quality assets in Chinese 
banks and they are so reluctant to lose the ownership. 
 
However, it is true Chinese government has a long way to go in terms of providing a 
proper environment for mortgage securitization. For example, there are not enough 
institutional investors, no well-established guaranteeing companies and credit rating 
agencies in China. There are difficulties to establish and operate SPV, the transfer of 
debts and the definition of “true selling”, etc. There is no law concerning mortgage 
securitization. Usually mortgage securitization has some preferential tax, but there 
is no such tax favorable policy in China, which will affect the cost of securitizing 
companies. There is no accounting system for mortgage securitization, too.  
 
Therefore, it is Chinese government but not banks only to take effort at first to 
develop a proper environment for mortgage securitization. Firstly, the government 
should establish a legal framework to smoothen and regulate the operation of 
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mortgage securitization. Secondly, the government needs to improve the tax and 
accounting system. Thirdly, the government can establish a national guarantee 
organization to provide security and insurance for securitized assets and ensure their 
credit score. Fourthly, the government needs to establish a nation-wide trading 
system to ensure the financial infrastructure. Last but not least, the government has 
to cultivate more institutional investors and more professionals in this specialized 
area by its policies. 
 
C. interest rate risk 
In order to lower the interest rate risk, it is better to apply floating rate to mortgages.  
But the calculating of floating rate is complicated and most customers are reluctant 
to accept floating rate. But applying fixed rate to mortgages will expose banks to 
the risk of prerepayment of loans. 
 
Whether Fixed Rate Mortgage (FRM)-making financial institutions will experience 
loss or not depends on their prediction of the future rate movement trend. In an 
interest rate rising situation, financial institutions will make profit in the early 
periods. But this profit should be saved for the later periods when losses appear. In 
an interest rate falling situation, financial institutions should keep adequate liquidity 
for the losses appeared in the early periods. 
 
Another way is to state clearly whether customers can repay the loan in advance or 
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not, or customers can only prerepay loans within a stipulated term. In the United 
States, some banks charges customers if they repay their loans ahead of the agreed 
time in contracts. 
 
D. collateral disposal risk 
First, there should be clearly defined property rights and property rights protection 
laws. Without this, mortgage registration is impossible. Then banks will have a lot 
of difficulties to dispose collateralized houses. 
 
Second, there should be a national mortgage registration system in case a house 
owner repeatedly collateralizes his house. 
 
Third, there should be independent real estate appraising agencies. It is common 
practice for a bank to choose a lower one among the price estimated by appraising 
agencies and the sales price of the loan borrower as the mortgage loan amount. 
Therefore the estimated price given by appraising agencies is very important. But 
there would be much different estimated prices by different appraising agencies for 
the same house, which will expose banks to risks. So the government should 
formulate regulatory measures to those agencies, help to make a uniform and 
scientific appraising procedures for them and strictly set up the qualification for 
specialists work in real estate appraising areas. 
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Forth, we should establish a well-functioning auction system. If a borrower can’t 
repay the loan, the bank has to dispose of the house according to the contract. But 
the amount of cost and speed of disposing the house would constitute a loss to the 
bank. Or the government could set up independent disposal guarantee organizations. 
If a borrower can’t repay the loan, such an organization could pay the bank first and 
then deal with the collateral. 
 
Fifth, the government should have the national housing security arrangement in case 
a borrower becomes homeless if he can’t repay the loan. Banks are not charities. 
The government is responsible for providing cheap homes for the poor. 
 
E. macroeconomic change 
Banks should pay enough attention to the macroeconomic analysis. Like the social 
economy, real estate market has a development cycle that is a prosperity period and 
a depression period. Real estate market is also influenced by the national and local 
economy, population, policies and other factors. The real estate price movement 
makes up a risk to banks. When the real estate price drops, the collaterals value will 
decrease and banks will face higher risk. Therefore, it is an important measure for 
banks to guard against such a risk to determine a proper ratio of loan to value by 
forecasting the trend of the market changes. In market recession, banks can increase 
the ratio while in market recovery, banks must lower the ratio.  To China, a 
country that has not experience a full market cycle, this is particularly important. 
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Otherwise it would be a disaster to Chinese banking industry. 
 
Not only the first and the secondary mortgage markets are sophisticated in western 
countries, but also they accumulated more experience in controlling the relevant 
risks. First, it is urgent for Chinese banks to accumulate and improve their data bank 
on loans for more quantitative and standadized research. The traditional 
experience-based subjective risk control methods are already out of date. Western 
banks establish quantitative models to evaluate and manage risks, which should be 
the trend for Chinese banks. Second, banking industry is always easy to adopt 
advanced informtion technology. Banks like Chase, Bank of America and CitiBank 
have developed their own global credit risk exposure information system(John B. 
Koat, 2001). Although Chinese banks have installed computer systems, much of the 
mortgage information is still paper-based. It is difficult for them to recognize, 
evaluat and work on risks rapidly and accurately based on the information provided 
by electronic systems. Only when Chinese banks accumulated enough historical 
mortgage infromation and store them in electronic systems, Chinese banks can do 
the advanced risk-control researches such as LTV and mortgage risks, fixed-rate and 
floating-rate mortgages and their risks and other researches on macro or micro 
factors and default risks. 
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VI. Summary 
Mortgage in China has a very short history of development. Chinese banks have not 
much experience to deal with the related risks. It is very important to them to draw 
lessons and experiences from those countries with a long history of mortgage first 
and secondary markets development, especially the United States. At the earlier 
stage, Chinese government should do a lot to introduce more laws, to provide a 
better financial infrastructure, to educate both mortgagors and mortgagees, to 
encourage competition and innovation and to deregulate the interest rate system. 
 
 
Notes: 
(1), (2) Liu Zhifeng, vice minister of National Construction Ministry, May 2002. 
(3), (4), (5) People’s Bank of China, 2001. 
(6) Federal Reserve System, 2001. 
(7) Gu Yunchang, the vice chairman of China Real Estate Association, 2002. 
(8) Wang Kongping, sina.com, 2003. 
(9) China Construction Bank, 2004. 
(10) Industrial Bank of China, 2004. 
(11) The Federal Reserve System, 2004. 
(12), (13), (14) Guangzhou Real Estate Information Center, 2004. 
(15) Shanghai Statistics Bureau, 2004. 
 
 39
 
Bibliography 
David J. Behling, U.S. Mortgage Markets and Institutions and Their Relevance for 
Korea, 2002, Working Paper 02-08 of KDI School of Public Policy and 
Management 
Fabozzi and Modigliani, Mortgage and Mortgag-Backed Securities Markets, 1992, 
Harvard Business School Press 
Fabozzi, Fixed Income Mathematics, Third Edition, 1997, McGraw-Hill 
D. Geltner and N. Miller, Commercial Real Estate Analysis and Investments, 2001, 
South-Western College Publishing Co. 
Gregory D. Squires etc., From Redlining to Reinvestment, 1992, Temple University 
Press  
Lakhbir Hayer etc., Salomon Smith Barney Guide to Mortgage-Backed and 
Asset-Backed Securities, 2001, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Louis J. Karcher, Processing Mortgage-Backed Securities, 1989, New York Institute 
of Finance 
Frank J. Fabozzi etc., Bank Loans: Secondary Market and Portfolio Management, 
1998, Frank J. Fabozzi Associates 
Frank J. Fabozzi etc., The Handbook of Mortgage-Backed Securities, Fifth Edition, 
2001, McGraw-Hill 
Frank J. Fabozzi etc., The Handbook of Fixed Income Securities, Fifth Edition,1997, 
IRWIN Professional Publishing 
 40
Stephen A. Ross, The Debt Market Vol. III Fixed Income Instruments, 2000, An 
Elgar Reference Collection 
 
“Whose is the fairest of them all?” The Economist October 18th 2003  
“我国个人住房抵押贷款存在的问题与对策”, <中外房地产导报> 2002-12-26 
董月鲜, “建立住房贷款风险防范机制”, <经济参考报> 2003-03-19 
汪利娜 , “中国推行抵押贷款证券化的理性思考及制度安排”, <联合论坛> 
2003-10-26 
王孔平, “中国银行业: 戴着镣铐跳舞 痛并快乐着”, <新浪网>, 2003-10-25 
黄石松 , 陈红梅 , “前沿理论虚拟经济与房地产泡沫”, <中国房地产报>, 
2003-05-28 
 
 
 
